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Recent Revisions to Corporate Profits: 
What We Know and When We Knew It
Charles P. Himmelberg, James M. Mahoney, April Bang, and Brian Chernoff
Initial estimates in the National Income and Product Accounts significantly overstated U.S. 
corporate profits for the 1998-2000 period. Subsequent revisions reveal that the profitability of
the nation’s corporate sector in the late 1990s was substantially weaker than “real-time” data
indicated. An unexpected surge in employee stock options exercised—and perhaps, in some sectors,
firms’ inflated statements of profit—may help explain the large downward revisions.
R
ecently revised estimates of aggregate 
corporate profits show that U.S.corpora-
tions were far less profitable at the end 
of the 1990s than previously thought.Back in July 2000,
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),in its Survey of
Current Business, estimated that aggregate after-tax 
corporate profits had totaled $513.6 billion for 1998 and
$567.1 billion for 1999. In July 2002, however, the BEA
revised these numbers downward by $31 billion and 
$52.8 billion,respectively.Profits for 2000,too,were revised
downward, from $574 billion to $523 billion.As of July
2002, the cumulative downward profit revisions for the
years 1998,1999,and 2000 totaled 11.0 percent,9.3 per-
cent,and 8.9 percent,respectively.
These large downward revisions raise significant ques-
tions about the U.S. economy’s recent performance.
Corporate profits provide the single best “bottom line”
assessment of the current health and future prospects of
the corporate sector.Indeed,corporate profits play a cen-
tral role in determining the attractiveness of business
expenditures on fixed capital,research and development,
and employee development.
Profits also provide important information to capital
markets.In equity markets,for example,information about
profits helps investors forecast future dividends and deter-
mine the price they are willing to pay for equity.Similarly,
in debt markets,profits determine a borrower’s ability to
repay the borrowed funds and thus the amount of credit
that lenders are willing to extend.
Although the BEA is not the primary source of profit data
for managers and markets,the magnitude of the BEA revi-
sions nevertheless reveals how difficult it can be to obtain
precise “real-time”measures of corporate profitability.
In this edition of Current Issues,we examine the magni-
tude and causes of the BEA’s latest revisions to corporate
profits in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) for the 1998-2000 period.We find that these same
revisions are among the largest of the past forty years.
Although the revisions’ origins are difficult to identify 
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exercising of employee stock options over this period is a
large part of the story.In some industries,this unexpected
surge is large enough to explain the full extent of the revi-
sions. In other industries, it is clear that other factors—
including the widely publicized accounting scandals of
recent years—played a partial role.
Measuring Corporate Profits:Conceptual and Practical
Considerations
Conceptually,the definition of corporate profits is straight-
forward;converting this definition into practice,however,is
not.The goal in the National Income and Product Accounts is
to measure income generated by the current production of
goods and services,and that requires a definition different
from the one used in conventional financial accounting.For
example,items such as capital gains are included as profits
under conventional financial accounting,but because they do
not represent income from currently produced goods and
services,they are not included in the NIPA definition (Petrick
2001).We refer to the difference between NIPA profits and
financial accounting profits as the “NIPA–financial gap.”
To balance timeliness with accuracy,the BEA publishes a
series of corporate profit estimates,then recalculates each
successive estimate more accurately as more complete data
become available.Financial statement data from the filings
of large public corporations are generally available on a
quarterly basis,but these same data are not available for the
vast majority of small, privately owned corporations. Tax 
filings,by contrast,provide exhaustive coverage of all corpo-
rations and are a source of data not available from financial
statements.The problem with tax filings,however,is timeli-
ness: Initial data are not available to the BEA until about a
year after a calendar year-end.Thus,before the tax filings
become available,the BEA is forced to rely on a variety of
publicly available sources to estimate corporate profits.1
On an annual basis, the BEA’s July release includes an 
estimate of annual profits for the most recently completed
calendar year—a release known as the “first July”estimate.2
This estimate,based mainly on the financial statement data
of publicly traded firms,is revised with lags of one and two
years in what are known,respectively,as the “second July”
and “third July”estimates.The second and third July esti-
mates are based on tax filings with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and therefore reflect information on hundreds
of thousands of additional firms that is not available for the
first July estimates.
In addition,tax filings provide valuable information to
the BEA even for publicly traded companies because the
NIPA definition of profits is closer to the tax definition than
to the financial definition. These annual July revisions to 
corporate profit estimates therefore reflect not only the
larger number of firms sampled, but also unexpected
changes in the definitional gap between financial profits and
tax profits.
In addition to this regular schedule of initial and revised
profit estimates,the BEA issues a set of comprehensive revi-
sions about every five years.The comprehensive revisions
include 1) definitional and classification changes, which
allow for a more accurate depiction of the U.S. economy;
2) statistical changes,which use improved methodologies
and incorporate better data; and 3) presentational changes,
which incorporate the former two changes and render the
tables more informative.
Recent Revisions to NIPA Corporate Profits
The recent pattern of downward revisions is obvious in 
plots of the corporate profit data.Chart 1 plots four succes-
sive “vintages,” from 1999 to 2002, of quarterly after-tax 
corporate profits for the 1995-2001 period.3 (Because of
comprehensive revisions,the annual estimates for 1999 were
released in December rather than July.) Each line,or vintage,
represents the real-time perspective on the historical time
series—in other words,it shows each time series as it would
have appeared to an observer on that vintage date.According
to the chart,the revisions were negative in each of the annual
releases from 2000 to 2002.These data are reported in Panel A
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Corporate profits are reported after tax and without capital consumption 
adjustment (CCA) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA).
Chart 1
Corporate Profits by Vintage



















vintageof Table 1,where each column represents a data vintage and
each row represents the calendar year for which the BEA was
estimating profits.
To minimize the effect that definitional changes can have
on levels, we also examine the impact of revisions on the
estimated growth rate of profits.Panel B of Table 1 shows the
decline in the BEA’s estimates of annual growth in 
corporate profits implied by the revisions over the past few
years.In the July data releases of 2000,2001,and 2002,the
revisions to growth rates in corporate profits for calendar
years 1998,1999,and 2000 were consistently negative.The
December 1999 release indicated a -2.9 percent growth rate
of corporate profits for 1998; this estimate was lowered 
to -7.5 percent in July 2000 and down still further to 
-13.1 percent in July 2001.Similarly,the original estimate of
corporate profits growth for 1999 was 10.4 percent,but was
subsequently lowered to 8.5 percent in July 2001 and down
further to 6.6 percent in July 2002. Finally, the original 
estimate of year 2000 corporate profits growth, released 
in July 2001,was 9.7 percent,subsequently revised down to
1.7 percent in July 2002.
To put these revisions into historical perspective, we 
use data available from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s real-time data set,which contains each vin-
tage of data for aggregate after-tax corporate profits.4
Chart 2 plots the total revision (that is,from the first July
estimate to the third July estimate) to the one-year growth
rates of NIPA corporate after-tax profits from 1966 to 2000.
(The final bar shows only the revision implied by the second
July estimate because the final revision for 2001 is not yet
available.)
The recent downward revisions to the growth rate of cor-
porate profits are the largest in our historical sample (which
begins in 1966) and represent a sharp departure from a
recent trend of upward revisions.In the eleven years preced-
ing 1998,the total revision to the one-year growth rate for
profits was positive for nine years, averaging 4.1 percent.
By contrast, the downward revisions of 12.0 percent and 
11.4 percent for 1998 and 2000 represent the largest and 
second-largest negative revisions,respectively,to one-year
growth rates in our sample.
Why Were the Recent Revisions So Large?
The revisions to corporate profits over the years 1998-2000
raise an obvious question:Why were they so unusually large
and negative,especially given the long sequence of largely
positive revisions that preceded them? Perhaps the financial
corporate profit data used in the first July estimates have
become a less reliable predictor of final NIPA data—in other
words,perhaps the NIPA–financial gap widened unexpect-
edly. Two recent studies (Manzon and Plesko 2002; Mills,
Newberry,and Trautman 2002) document a breakdown of
www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, real-time data set; authors’ 
calculations.
Note: Corporate profits are reported after tax and without capital consumption 
adjustment (CCA) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA).
Chart 2
Revision to One-Year Growth Rate of Annual Corporate Profits 
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Dec 99a Jul 00 Jul 01 Jul 02 Dec 03a
Panel A:Corporate Profits (Billions of Dollars,Nominal)
1996 502.7 502.7 502.7 502.7 501.4
1997 557.6 555.2 555.2 555.2 552.1
1998 541.7 513.6 482.3 482.3 470.0
1999 — 567.1 523.3 514.3 517.2
2000 — — 574.0 523.0 508.2
2001 — — — 470.9 495.6
2002 — — — — 549.9
Panel B:Estimates of One-Year Growth Rates in Corporate Profits (Percent)
1997 10.9 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.1
1998 -2.9 -7.5 -13.1 -13.1 -14.9
1999 — 10.4 8.5 6.6 10.0
2000 — — 9.7 1.7 -1.7
2001 — — — -10.0 -2.5
2002 — — — — 11.0
Sources:U.S.Department of Commerce,Bureau of Economic Analysis;authors’
calculations.
Note:Corporate profits are reported after tax and without capital consumption
adjustment (CCA) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA).
aThere were no July revisions for 1999 or for 2003 because comprehensive revisions
were released in these years.the historical relationship between financial accounting
profits and NIPA profits.
Our calculations using annual data confirm their find-
ings.We find that a rolling ten-year correlation between the
growth rate of S&P 500 earnings (which reflect financial
accounting profits) and NIPA profits ranged from 0.85 to
0.95 in the period from the 1950s through the 1980s.This
correlation,however,fell throughout the 1990s to a low of
about 0.35 for the decade.This result suggests that the data
available for the BEA’s first July estimate of corporate profits,
which is based primarily on financial accounting profits,
have become a less reliable predictor of the final estimate of
NIPA profits.
What is causing this divergence between financial profits
and the final NIPA numbers? We consider two possibilities.
The first is an increased use of employee stock options.The
expense associated with stock options can be accurately
assessed by the BEA only at the time of the second- or third-
round profit estimates. The second possible cause is the
reported increase in “aggressive accounting”—accounting
choices designed to artificially inflate profits—especially
among publicly traded corporations whose management has
an incentive to report to shareholders growing profit figures.
Do Recent Revisions Reflect an Unexpected Surge 
in Exercised Stock Options?
One reason for the widening NIPA-financial gap may be the
rapid growth of employee stock options.When exercised,
stock options are treated as an employee compensation
expense,both in tax profits and in NIPA profits.However,
stock options are generally not treated as an expense in
financial profits.In addition,corporations disclose the value
of options exercised on an annual basis, not on a typical
quarterly filing schedule.Therefore,when the BEA calculates
its first-round corporate profit figures,it must estimate the
magnitude of stock options exercised.For the latter-round
profit estimates,however,the BEA has access to firms’tax fil-
ings and can revise its first-round profit estimate to reflect
the realized value of the stock options exercised.
The BEA itself suggests that recent revisions to NIPA
profit estimates were caused in part by an unexpected surge
in the value of stock options exercised by employees.Seskin
and McCulla (2002,p.25) of the BEA contend that “the large
downward revisions to profits for 1999 and 2000 may reflect
the fact that the employee stock options that many high-tech
companies,such as Internet firms,began providing in the
mid-1990s became fully vested,and the employees started to
exercise their options.”Consistent with this claim,estimates
by Mills, Newberry, and Trautman (2002) indicate that
employee stock options account for as much as half the dif-
ference between tax and financial income in the 1990s.
How much of the recent revisions to corporate profits can
be attributed to the growth in exercised stock options? To
answer this question, we estimate the growth of stock
options exercised for the 1996-2001 period and ask 
1) whether it is large enough to explain the extent of the revi-
sions to aggregate corporate profits data and 2) whether it
can account for the pattern of revisions across industries.
To construct aggregate and sector-level data on the exer-
cised employee stock options,we segment the universe of
firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database by BEA
sector.For each year in each sector,we sort firms by asset
size and select enough of the largest firms (in descending
order) to cover at least 40 percent of assets.We then examine
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K filings
to determine the value of employee stock options exercised.
We measure this value as the number of options exercised
times the difference between the stock price and the exercise
price. This measure corresponds to the BEA’s definition 
of employee stock options exercised. Finally, to estimate 
the aggregate value of employee stock options exercised for
each industry sector,we divide the aggregate estimate in our
sample by the fraction of assets of the sector covered by our
sample.This scaling assumes that the sample is representa-
tive of the sector in terms of employee stock options 
exercised as a fraction of firm assets.
Our findings, summarized in Table 2, indicate that the
aggregate value of stock options exercised has swelled in
recent years.The value exercised increased from $68.6 billion
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Table 2
Employee Stock Options Exercised
Billions of Dollars
Calendar Year
Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000
Services 8.93 20.57 47.57 78.09
Communications 3.35 9.74 9.90 6.63
Durables 14.05 19.44 32.56 55.89
Finance,insurance,
and real estate 23.08 22.23 22.61 24.50
Trade 3.98 4.94 5.14 7.92
Nondurables 12.70 21.13 19.82 21.88
Agriculture and mining 1.24 0.34 0.28 0.99
Utilities 0.86 0.88 0.72 0.69
Transportation 0.35 0.67 0.61 0.69
Construction 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.09
Total 68.61 100.08 139.29 197.37
Sources:Standard and Poor’s Execucomp;authors’calculations.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 5
in 1997 to $100.1 billion in 1998,to $139.3 billion in 1999,
and to $197.4 billion in 2000,nearly tripling in three years.
The two sectors that experienced the most significant
increases in employee stock options exercised over the 1997-
2000 period were durables (from $14 billion to $56 billion)
and services (from $9 billion to $78 billion).If we assume
that the two-year change in these stock options exercised is a
reasonable approximation of the two-year “surprise”in stock
options exercised,these data show that the biggest surprises
from 1998 to 2000 came in services (up from $20 billion to 
$78 billion) and durable goods (up from $20 billion to 
$56 billion).
We then consider whether the sector-specific increases in
stock options exercised can explain the pattern of profit revi-
sions across sectors.First,we break out the corporate profit
revisions by sector (Chart 3 and Table 3).Then,in Chart 4,
we plot the revisions against option exercise for each sector,
using the data in Table 3.As the chart shows,the two sectors
with the largest changes in employee stock options exer-
cised—durables and services—experienced similarly large
downward revisions to profits.This result is consistent with
the view that unanticipated increases in the exercise of
employee stock options have contributed significantly to
profit revisions.
One exception to this finding,however,is the communi-
cations sector.This sector had the second-largest downward
revision to profits despite a slight decline in employee stock
options exercised.So although we conclude that the unex-
pected rise in employee stock options exercised can explain
most of the profit revision,it is obvious that in some indus-
tries other factors were at work.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
authors’ calculations.
Note: Corporate profits are reported after tax and without capital consumption 
adjustment (CCA) and inventory valuation adjustment (IVA).
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Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Standard 
and Poor’s Execucomp; authors’ calculations.
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and Aggregate Corporate Profit Revisions,1999-2000 
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Finance,insurance,and real estate 16.9 2.27
Trade -16.0 2.97
Nondurables 3.2 0.75





Sources:U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis;Standard 
and Poor’s Execucomp;authors’calculations.Do Recent Revisions Reflect More Aggressive
Accounting?
Anecdotal evidence in the form of highly publicized
accounting scandals and earnings restatements suggests
that during 1999 and 2000,financial accounting for profits
may have become more aggressive,leading to inflated state-
ments of corporate profits.Earnings restatements must be
filed with the SEC if companies find that they have signifi-
cantly misreported their profits.Studies by the U.S.General
Accounting Office (2002) and Moriarty and Livingston
(2001) find that the total number of financial accounting
restatements increased dramatically in the latter half of
the 1990s. The evidence presented in these two studies 
suggests that corporations over this period were increas-
ingly aggressive in their financial accounting statements,
especially in recognizing revenues earlier than allowed by
generally accepted accounting principles.
Is it possible that the deteriorating quality of the financial
accounting data used to construct the preliminary esti-
mates is responsible for recent profit revisions? Aggressive
accounting per se does not necessarily result in profit revi-
sions if firms overstate financial profits and tax profits by
similar amounts.But suppose firms overstated profits on
the financial statements the BEA used to construct the first
July estimates.If those firms also filed amended tax returns
before the third July estimates,then the restated profits data
would lead to a revision of NIPA profits.
This explanation is theoretically possible,but the magni-
tude of the accounting restatements is large enough to
explain only a modest portion of the recent NIPA profit 
revisions.We collected data on earnings restatements from
SEC filings (8-K,10-K,and 10-Q filings) and press reports
dating back to 1999.These data reveal that restatements in
the communications industry over the 1999-2000 period
totaled less than $5 billion.The actual impact is smaller still
because restatements cause profit revisions only to the
extent that the restated earnings numbers subsequently
appear on amended tax returns.Thus,even in the commu-
nications industry,where accounting scandals were highly
publicized, the direct distortion due to earnings restate-
ments obviously falls far short of the $38.8 billion NIPA
revision reported in Table 3.
There are other possible causes for the profit revisions in
the communications industry. In the first July estimates,
extrapolations from data from publicly traded corporations
are used to estimate profits for private corporations. In 
the late 1990s, the communications industry witnessed 
the entry of a large number of new firms that were,on the
whole,unprofitable (see,for example,Brookings Institution
[2002]).Since most of these new entrants were private com-
panies,the extent of their financial losses was not known
until their tax returns became available.5 In addition, if
publicly traded corporations were overstating profits more
aggressively than privately held firms over this period,then
subsequent use of tax data on private companies in place of
these extrapolations would lead to additional downward
revisions in the third July estimate.
Consider how this last factor might affect the calculation of
profits in the communications industry.It now appears that
WorldCom and Qwest overstated earnings for 1999 and 2000
by roughly $4 billion.Assuming that these two companies
account for roughly 10 percent of profits for publicly traded
firms in the industry,their earnings overstatements would
imply $40 billion in overstatements by publicly held firms.6
If this magnitude of overstated profits was extrapolated to 
privately held firms,and if private firms were 20 percent of
industry profits (a high estimate),then this would cause the
BEA to overstate private sector profits by $10 billion. This 
figure would be corrected in the final BEA calculations,based
on IRS data,and would therefore cause a downward revision
of $10 billion.Accordingly,even in this worst-case scenario,
the magnitude of the accounting restatements is still not large
enough to account for the $38.8 billion in revisions reported
for the communications industry (Table 3).
A final possibility is that,during 1999 and 2000,firms
increasingly reported to shareholders income that was 
sheltered for tax purposes.Desai (2002) infers the growth of
tax shelters by adjusting for all other observable discrepan-
cies between financial profits and tax profits,including the
exercise of employee stock options.He concludes that the 
use of tax shelters has grown substantially in recent years.
This explanation is consistent with the timing of recent
profit revisions: Initial profit estimates,based on financial
statements,were revised when the tax-based data became
available.Without access to firms’confidential tax filings,
however,the magnitude of this effect cannot be estimated
reliably.
Conclusion
We have shown that revisions to corporate profits for the
1998-2000 period were unusually large and negative.The
size of these revisions suggests that real-time data may 
have led markets and policymakers into thinking that 
corporate profitability was higher than subsequent data 
have revealed it to be.To the extent that corporate profitabil-
ity helps determine stock prices and corporate investment,
the overstatement of profits may have caused investors and
corporate managers to misallocate funds over this period.
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conclude that,for some industries,the unexpected surge in
the value of stock options exercised during 1999 and 2000
played the major role.In other industries,notably communi-
cations,the evidence suggests that increasingly aggressive
accounting, though harder to quantify, may have been a 
contributing factor.
We also conclude that the growth of stock options and
aggressive accounting during the last half of the 1990s made
it increasingly difficult for the BEA to calculate preliminary
profit estimates.These problems seem to mirror those faced
by markets and policymakers during the same period,
underscoring the importance of recent reforms aimed at
improving the measurement of corporate profits.7
Notes
1. Petrick (2002) provides a detailed breakdown of estimate sources.For year
2000 data, the sources were the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Financial
Reports on Manufacturing,Wholesale and Retail; Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filings of public corporations; required filings for firms in
various regulated industries;and a range of miscellaneous sources.
2. On a quarterly basis,the BEA also releases preliminary estimates of corpo-
rate profits,then releases revised estimates one month later.
3. Owing to the availability of historical data,we focus on revisions to after-tax
profits without adjustments to inventory valuation and capital consumption.
Adjustments to those two items (which reconcile the different treatment of
gains or losses on inventories and depreciation) have little impact on the rela-
tive sizes of revisions for most years.
4. For more information on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s real-
time data set,go to <http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html>.
5. We thank Ken Petrick of the BEA for suggesting a link between the losses 
of the privately held communications firms and the downward revisions of
profits.
6. In 2002,based on SEC filings,WorldCom and Qwest restated earnings down
by $3.1 billion and $0.8 billion, respectively, for the 1999-2000 period. To
obtain an estimate of $40 billion in overstatements at the industry level,we use
the fact that,during this period,those two companies accounted for roughly 
10 percent of profits for publicly traded firms in the industry.We also require
an estimate of the extent to which firms that have not publicly restated earn-
ings may have nevertheless been overreporting. To illustrate a scenario in
which the magnitude of this bias is large,we assume that all publicly traded
firms in the communications industry were overstating earnings by propor-
tional amounts.
7. The BEA has recently improved its adjustment for exercised stock options.
See Moylan and Robinson (2003,p.24).
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